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Sanders v. Sears-Page, 131 Nev. Adv. Op. 50 (July 16, 2015)1 
 
CIVIL PROCEDURE: JUROR BIAS 
 
Summary 
 
 The Court held that the district court erred in deciding not to strike an empaneled juror 
whose background implied bias, but who promised he could remain impartial.  Moreover, the 
Court held the district court erred in allowing challenges for cause while the juror was present, 
and by allowing newly discovered evidence to be entered into evidence on the final day of trial.   
 
Background 
 
This case arose from a personal injury claim following a 2009 car accident.  Risa Sears-
Page hit Toni Sanders’ car when Sears-Page attempted to make a right turn from the left-hand 
lane.  Following the crash, Sanders began experiencing worsening neck pain.  Sanders, along 
with her husband Robert Sanders, sued Sears-Page for negligence.   
 
Sanders’ injuries 
 
 The primary issue at trial was whether the accident caused Sanders’ injuries and if so, 
whether Sanders’ medical expenses were reasonable.  Prior to the 2009 accident, Sanders had 
experienced back and neck pain.  Sanders doctors, however, claimed the 2009 accident was the 
cause of Sanders’ neck pain, and claimed her medical treatment and expenses were reasonable 
and necessary.  In further support of her claim, Sanders provided records and billing from 
Nevada Spine Clinic.   
 The Defendant and her experts argued that Sanders’ injuries had not occurred as a result 
of the 2009 accident, but rather were pre-existing.  The Defense claimed the doctors at Nevada 
Spine Clinic had pushed Sanders into having an unnecessary spine surgery in order to run up her 
medical expenses.   
 
Juror 9 
 
 After trial began, Juror 9 notified the district court that he had previously been a patient at 
Nevada Spine Clinic.  During voir dire, neither party had mentioned Nevada Spine Clinic or Dr. 
Ghuman, Juror 9’s treating physician.  The district court and counsel questioned juror 9.  Juror 9 
explained that he had been to Nevada Spine Clinic because of a herniated disc.  There, Juror 9 
was advised that back surgery would be a necessity.  Juror 9 opted for a second opinion, and was 
told by the second physician that surgery was unnecessary.   
 Juror 9 explained to the district court and counsel that he could remain impartial and 
would fairly evaluate the Nevada Spine Clinic’s doctor’s opinions.   
 While Juror 9 was present, the district court asked counsel if either side wished to 
challenge Juror 9 for cause.  Sanders’ counsel challenged Juror 9 for cause.  Sears-Page’s 
counsel agreed there was good reason to strike Juror 9; however, the district court denied 
Sanders’ motion to strike, and allowed Juror 9 to remain on the jury.   
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Exhibit 62 
 
 Prior to trial, both parties sought records from one of Sanders’ prior treating physicians, 
Dr. Pollard; however, Dr. Pollard provided them with only partial records.  During the trial, an 
unidentified individual delivered a box of documents box of documents to Sears-Page’s counsel. 
The box contained a portion of Dr. Pollard’s missing medical records from 2005.  The records 
said Sanders suffered from “spinal degenerative joint disease and upper cervical area with bone 
spur.”  This contradicted Sanders’ claims made at trial.   
 Sears-Page sought permission from the district court to enter the documents into 
evidence.  Sanders objected, but the district court admitted the document as exhibit 62.  Sears-
Page’s medical expert, Dr. Duke, examined exhibit 62 on the stand, and concluded that it 
supported his opinion, “that Sanders had a chronic, degenerative disease that predated the 2009 
automobile accident and was the sole cause of her neck pain.   
 The jury found for Sears-Page.  Sanders appeals.   
 
Discussion 
 
 The Nevada supreme court considered 4 issues: “whether the district court erred in (1) 
failing to strike Juror 9 for cause, (2) inviting challenges for cause while Juror 9 was present, (3) 
admitting exhibit 62, and (4) allowing Dr. Duke to give undisclosed opinions based on exhibit 
62.”   
 
Sanders’ challenge to Juror 9 for cause 
 
 “The Nevada Constitution, like the U.S. Constitution, guarantees litigants the right to a 
jury trial.”2  An important feature of jury trials is an impartial jury.  If a juror’s statements imply 
bias, the trial court must question the juror to determine whether the juror can be impartial.  A 
juror may be actually biased if the juror’s statements indicate a state of mind that would prevent 
the juror the being impartial in deciding the case.3 
 If the trial court questions the juror, and determines the juror is truly impartial, the 
Nevada Supreme Court will generally give wide deference to the trial court’s decision.  
However, deference will not be extended where failure to strike the juror was erroneous. In a 
situation like the one here, “if the juror’s statements, taken as a whole, indicate bias, the juror 
must be struck.”  
 Other jurisdictions have held that where a juror’s experiences are so similar to the one 
being tried, so as to make it improbable for the juror to be impartial, the juror must be stricken 
from the jury.4 The Nevada Supreme Court agreed, holding, “that if a juror’s ‘background is 
replete with circumstances which would all into question his ability to be fair,’5 the district court 
should remove the juror for cause, even if the juror has stated he or she can be impartial.”  In 
                                                        
2  NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 3.  
3  State v. Squaires, 2 Nev. 226, 230-31 (1866). 
4  See Kirk v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 61 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 1995); Wolfe v. Brigano, 232 F. 3d 499 (6th Cir. 2000).  
5  Kirk, 61 F.3d at 156.  
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determining whether to strike the juror, the district court should base its decision on objective 
facts regarding the juror’s experiences, rather relying on the juror’s promise to remain impartial. 
 Here, the Court held the district court abused its discretion in failing to strike Juror 9 for 
cause.  Juror 9’s experiences with Nevada Spine Clinic were similar to Sanders’.  Sanders’ case 
relied heavily on evidence provided by Nevada Spine Clinic.  Juror 9’s experience with Nevada 
Spine Clinic was likely to color Juror 9’s ability to objectively assess the evidence from Nevada 
Spine Clinic. The district court denied Sanders’ challenge to Juror 9 based on Juror 9’s promise 
to remain impartial.  However, Juror 9’s statement claiming impartiality was not unequivocal, 
thus further evidencing Juror 9’s inability to remain impartial.  The district court’s error is 
reversible because, “Juror 9’s presence on the jury resulted in an unfair empaneled jury.” 
  
A party’s challenge for cause while an empaneled juror is present 
 
 The Nevada Supreme Court has previously held that a district court’s conduct may 
prejudice jurors against a party.6  Here, the trial judge asked both parties if they wished to 
challenge Juror 9 for cause, while Juror 9 was still present in the courtroom.  Once Sanders said 
she wished to challenge Juror 9 for cause, the judge asked Juror 9 to exit the courtroom.  The 
Court held, “the district court’s process of requiring the parties to issue their challenges for cause 
in front of Juror 9 amounted to plain error.” This error is reversible.   
 
Exhibit 62 
 
 “A district court abuses its discretion by admitting medical expert testimony that fails to 
comply with Nevada’s rules governing the admission of evidence.”  The Court held that, “the 
district court abused its discretion in admitting exhibit 62 because it was not properly 
authenticated.” Furthermore, the Court held, “the district court further abused its discretion in 
allowing Dr. Duke to testify to an undisclosed opinion regarding exhibit 62.”   
 
Authentication 
 
 The Court held that exhibit 62 was improperly admitted because it was not authenticated.  
NRS 52.015(1) provides that, “authentication of a document requires evidence or some other 
showing ‘that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.’” Relevant to this case, a 
document may be authenticated by a witness if the witness has personal knowledge of the 
document.  If the witness does not have personal knowledge of the document, then the witness’ 
testimony, alone, is not enough to authenticate the document.7 
 Here, Dr. Duke did not create the document, nor did he have personal knowledge of the 
document.  Therefore, Dr. Duke was not capable of authenticating the document through 
testimony.  “Because no other evidence corroborated exhibit 62, since Sanders testified she had 
not sought medical care for neck pain in 2005, and the exhibit was not properly authenticated, 
the district court abused its discretion in admitting exhibit 62.”  This error was not harmless.   
 
 
 
                                                        
6 See Ginnis v. Mapes Hotel Corp., 86 Nev. 408 (1970). 
7 See Frias v. Valle, 101 Nev. 219 (1985).  
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Undisclosed expert opinion 
 
 NRCP 16.1(a)(2) requires parties to disclose experts and the content of experts’ 
testimony in advance of trial.  The Nevada Supreme Court has previously held that a trial court 
erred when it allowed the plaintiff’s medical experts to offer opinions based on documents not 
disclosed during discovery.8  
 Here, the district court allowed Sears-Page’s medical expert, Dr. Duke, testify as to 
Sanders’ pre-existing neck pains while using exhibit 62 to support his opinion.  The district court 
erred in allowing Dr. Duke opine that exhibit 62 supported his stance that Sanders had been 
experiencing neck pain prior to the subject accident.  This was a violation of NRCP 16.1.   
 
Harmless error 
 
 The district court’s errors regarding exhibit 62, “were not harmless in light of the record 
as a whole.”  Exhibit 62 presented a surprise to the Plaintiff, Sanders, and unfairly prejudiced her 
case.  As such, the district court’s error was reversible.   
 
Conclusion 
 
 The Court held that the district court erred in failing to strike Juror 9 for cause, because 
Juror 9’s statements regarding his experience at Nevada Spine Clinic evidence bias against 
Sanders.  The district court further erred in allowing Juror 9 to be present when Sanders 
challenged Juror 9 for cause.  The district court erred by admitting exhibit 62 into evidence 
without it having been properly authenticated.  Finally, the district court erred when it allowed 
Dr. Duke to testify using exhibit 62.  The Court reversed and remanded for a new trial.   
                                                        
8 See FCH1, LLC v. Rodriguez, 335 P.3d 183 (2014).  
